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An Examination Factors Influencing Under-pricing of IPOs on the London Stock 
Exchange 
By Yuan Tian 
September 7, 2012 
The mispricing of IPOs has been widely examined in studies. According most 
research findings, IPOs on average, are underpriced in the short-run and correctly 
priced in the long-run. The purpose of this paper is to prove how the underpricing of 
IPOs on the London Stock Exchange is affected by issue size, firm age, systematic 
risk, underwriter reputation, P/E ratio, debt ratio, and ROA. Research has found the 
degree of underpricing on the London Stock Exchange market is 6.89744%.  
The result of this research reveals that issue size, systematic risk, and debt ratio 
influence the underpricing of IPOs. The large volume of issue size usually contributes 
to a lower degree of underpricing. The systematic risk and debt ratio result to a higher 
degree of underpricing. Thus, there exists a positive relationship between IPOs and 
systematic risk & debt ratio. Actually, because of the limitation of this research, the 
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Initial Public Offering (IPO) is defined as the first time shares sell to the general 
public or through a stock exchange to third-party investors. Typically, smaller, 
younger private companies usually issue IPOs to raise expansion capital, but IPOs are 
also useful for large-sized private companies for publicly traded company. For issuers, 
cash is an obvious reason for companies to go public. This money can be critical to 
hire new talents, develop new products, increase inventories, and build fundamental 
facilities. 
IPOs can enhance the credibility of a publicly traded company. This is especially 
important for them to attract more clients. From a financing perspective, going public 
will lower the company’s cost of capital. For investors, Philippe (2011) pointed out 
that IPOs give them the opportunity to make a significant position in a stock, 
something that would be in most cases more expensive and take a long time to 
perform in the secondary market. Additionally, for those who are interested 
purchasing IPOs, it could be a dangerous loss due to the unpredictable character. That 
explains why most firms indicate some forms of IPO discount for the first time they 
come to the market, which gives them appeal to other peer competitors and investors. 
 
Several empirical studies show that investors typically achieve a relatively large 




is, however, referred to IPO underpricing, and it means the difference between the 
first day trading price and closing market price even under the efficient market. This 
phenomenon does not exist for just one country but has expanded worldwide. In the 
1980s, the average first-day return on initial public offerings (IPOs) was 7%. The 
average first-day return doubled to almost 15% during 1990-1998, before jumping to 
65% during the internet bubble years of 1999-2000 and then reverting to 12% during 
2001-2003 (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Rogue (1973) attributes this phenomenon to 
either the inability or the reluctance of investment bankers to reoffer the shares in 
which they deal at market-clearing prices. On average, the risk adjusted rates of return 
on new issues investors bought at the offerings were significantly greater than they 
would be in an efficient market no matter if the holding period was two weeks, three 
months, or one year. 
 
1.2 Need for Study 
A number of papers consider what factors can cause the underpricing issue of initial 
offerings in the London Stock Exchange. In particular, the presence of venture capital 
firms among the IPO original shareholders, the underwriter reputation, firm-related 
risk factors, etc., have been identified as factors that may affect the degree of 
underpricing (Certo et al., 2001). Levis (1993) compares average initial returns for 
privatization IPOs to those of privately owned firms. Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) 
analyzed an integrated model of the ex-ante corporate governance development 




response in the UK. Steven (2006) researched the financial performance of IPOs in 
the UK utility privatization firm versus the nonutility privatization firm. At the same 
year, Coakley, Hadass and Wood (2006) assembled a specificexample of 591 IPOs 
issued on the London Stock Exchange to assess short run underpricing in the UK and 
the changing role of venture capitalists and underwriters in this respect. Ritter and 
Beatty (1984) testified a positive correlation between ex-ante uncertainty about an 
initial public offeringsprice and its expected initial return, specializing in underwriter 
reputation and risk. Information asymmetry surrounding firm value leaves the IPO 
market subject to the classic ‘lemons’ or ‘adverse selection’ problem (Akerlof, 1970). 
Although IPOs underpricing has always been a ‘hot issue’ topic, few researchers have 
tested multiple factors influencing underpricing of IPOs in the UK.However, all these 
research studies are conducted by using the US samples. Instead, this paper examines 
the importance of underpricing of IPOs in the London Stock Exchange. 
 
1.3 Purpose of Study 
This study will examine multiple factors influencing the level of the underpricing and 
how those factors can affect the degree of underpricing in the London Stock Exchange. 
The multiple factors consist of underwriter reputation, debt ratio, firm age, issue size, 
market capitalization, and return on asset (ROA). This research is common nowadays; 
still, it has exceptional importance of IPOs to investors. As long as we incorporate 
more variables in the research, this in turn will facilitate a powerful means of 




the actual observation of firms.  
The first contribution of this study is that it fills the lacuna in the IPOs market by 
justifying the underpriced pressure from the UK’s stance. To run an organized 
research, this study employs a distinctive sample of firms listed in the London Stock 
Exchange from 2002 to 2012. At this time frame, the average first-day gain is 
relatively stable within the area 12% to 18% after the bubble year happened at 1999. 




The London Stock Market does not fluctuate too much even during the financial crisis 
at 2008. Furthermore, from the table 1.2, it shows the average initial return of 21 
countries worldwide. In the Europe IPOs market, the average initial return of the UK 
is 16.8% from 1960 to 2011 which ranks in the bottom 3 compared with Netherlands, 
Poland, Russia, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, and Spain. This paper will 





Table 1.2: Equally Weighted Average Initial Return for 21 Countries 
 
Source: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm 
This study also provides an empirical test under the structure from one of Beatty and 
Ritter’s (1985) hypotheses. They combine several ex-ante uncertainty factors 
consisting of risk volatility and investment bankers’ reputation in the model. However, 
this article will improve the evaluation factors by adding some new ones, including 
the issuing size, the age of the firm, debt ratio and market capitalization. Beatty and 
Ritter (1984) also argue that the greater the ex-ante uncertainty the greater the 
(expected) underpricing. This research plans to figure out whether there is an obvious 




Sharma and Serapham (2010) believed that Underpricing is one of the most observed 
phenomena worldwide. Basically, every country, IPO issues experience some sort of 
underpricing. This paper tries to explore the relationship between underpricing of IPO 
and issue size, underwriter reputation, systematic risk, P/E ratio, ROA, and firm age. 
The findings of this study can be used for individual investors on deciding the IPO 
investment. 
The content of the rest of the paper is as follow. Section 2 will summarize the 
evidence of IPOs underpricing. Section 3 will introduce the methodology and 
datacollection. Section 4 will give the hypothesis result, and the last section is the 


















This chapter will explore theories and concepts that support the underpricing of IPOs. 
Additionally, this paper examines some theoretical findings conducted on this area. 
An attemptis also made to compare and contrast some of these findings. 
 
2.1 Hypothesis of Asymmetric Information 
Past researches on initial public offerings demonstrate that persistence of mispricing 
phenomenon can be explained by asymmetric information. An explanation for the 
exceptional price behavior is called ‘winner’s curse’ which was developed by Rock in 
1986. In this model, Rock defined two types of investors, including well-informed 
investors, who realized the true value of IPO issues, and uninformed investors, who 
obtained limited information to estimate the true value of IPOs. Basically, informed 
investors will bid on all successful IPOs and crowd out less successful IPOs. However, 
to raise sufficient numbers of uninformed investors participating in the IPOs market, 
companies usually offer a bonus or a reduction to shares.  
One factor contributed to winner’s curse is the issue size. The large the size, the more 
information about the intrinsic value of IPOs companies will give; therefore, the less 
probable the existence of information asymmetry. Some recent research also supports 
this hypothesis. Kennedy, Sivakumar, and Vetzal (2004) studied the asymmetric 
information importance on the corporation and insiders. They have found that firms 




However, insiders’ wealth appears to be maximized. Specifically, the extent that 
insiders care about the underpricing of IPOs depends on how much they sell in the 
initial offerings. The more shares they sell the stronger the incentive to incur the costs 
of promoting the issue and generating the information to reduce their 
underpricing-related wealth losses. In their research, they include three most 
convincing models to confirm the asymmetric information and aftermarket IPOs, 
which are the entrepreneurial losses model from Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), 
information momentum model from Aggarwal et al. (2002) and signaling model 
(Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989, 1996). 
However, the result shows that insiders seem to focus on their net assets, considering 
both the IPO and subsequent share sales and holdings and minimizing the impact of 
IPO underpricing by retaining their shares at the IPO.  
 
2.2 Hypothesis of Ex-ante Uncertainty: 
2.2.1 Underwriter Reputation and Underpricing of IPOs: 
In an attempt to explain underwriter behavior, Rogue (1973) selected 250 samples 
from 1965 to 1969 to try several independent variables including market situation and 
the type of underwriter. This study was based on the quality of the underwriter. It 
suggested that prestigious underwriters were more demanding than non-prestigious 
underwriters; very prestigious underwriters normally create IPOs more attentive to 
intrinsic value. By running the regression test, he found an inverse relationship 




for other experts who are interested in IPOs, of thoroughly exploring the area related 
with underwriter reputation. 
Trueman and Titman (1985) also strengthened Rogue’s research, and they produced a 
model which is relevant to the choice of investment banker type, or any outsiders who 
can provide information to the firm. A satisfactory quality auditor is sending a 
positive signal to investors. Technically, the higher the auditors’ reputation, the 
greater confidence of investors’ judgments to the firm value, and therefore, the lesser 
amount IPOs are underpriced. 
Carter and Manaster (1990) proved that lower risk was associated with prestigious 
underwriters. With nonprestigious underwriters, there are higher probabilities of 
mispricing at initial offerings. Consequently, a relatively low first-day abnormal 
return is proportionate to prestigious underwriters.The same conclusion of the 
relationship between the prestigious investment bankers and underpricing of IPOs 
comes from Johnson and Miller (1988), Megginson and Weiss (1991), and Sharma 
and Seraphim (2010). All these same conclusions apply to the suggestion that how 
firms prepare IPOs may promote competition among underwriters. 
Generally, companies with great financial perspectives enable them to hire 
high-quality underwriters. This will send a positive signal to the public. Market will 
assume that if the IPOs do not perform as well as expected, the company will recover 
the loss from the prestigious underwriters. Underwriters with high-quality will 
prevent the risk of underpricing from the beginning. By hiring prestigious 




to maintain their good reputation, underwriters should decline issuing IPOs. 
 
2.2.2 Firm Age and underpricing of IPOs 
Clark (2002) tested the relationship between the age-at-IPO of the company and the 
aftermarket stock performance. He categorized sample firms into high-technology 
firms and non-technology firms. An example of 1,234 firms meets the selection 
criteria during the period 1991 to 1997. From the test, the data shows a significant 
correlation between the age-at-IPO and IPO aftermarket performance. Specifically, 
high-technology firms obtain a negative relationship between the firm age and excess 
return, which is contrary to the nontechnology firms. However, Ritter (1991), as well 
as Clarkson and Merkley (1994) believed that despite the industry category, the age of 
the firm will affect the degree of underpricing negatively. It advocates that those long 
established firms will have less risk experiencing the underpricing of IPOs than those 
firms with short history. 
 
2.2.3 Risk and underpricing of IPOs 
One of the important observations of ex-ante uncertainty is the standard deviation of 
the IPO’s first day return in the aftermarket. Ritter (1984) found a significant 
relationship between the standard deviation and the first-day average yield of IPOs. 
Here, the standard deviation is the overall risk which is not directly observed from 
IPO market. Even though Ritter conducted the experiment using the overall risk as a 




over the standard deviation.  
Clarkson and Thompson (1990) questioned the idea that whenever there is quite little 
information available regarding the issuing firms, investors willface more risks due to 
the lack of uncertainty of the correct parameters of their dividenddistributions. They 
collected a sample data set of 198 IPOs within the time horizon of 1976 to 1985 and 
realized that the systematic risk decreased along the several periods to the time of 
offerings. This explains how the risk correlates with the uncertainty of firms. Since 
the systematic risk is a suitableproxy for ex-ante uncertainty of the IPOs, it implies 
that the systematic risk connects with individual risk. Therefore, a positive 
relationship is testified. It represents the higher the systematic risk of an IPO the 
higher the ex-ante uncertainty regarding its market price then the higher proportion of 
underpricing for that IPO. 
Based on the previous research, Almisher and Kish (2000) analyzed that the 
accounting beta is an ex-ante proxy for uncertainty in the IPO market. They gathered 
2708 companies that conducted IPOs in United States from 1990 to 1995 at 
NASDAQ and NASDAQ OTC. After running the regression model, they proved there 
is a significant, direct relationship between the accounting beta and the first day return 
of IPOs in the market. This cruciallink cannot be ignored whether they use income 
before the extraordinary items or net income, or those samples tradingin NASDAQ, 
NASDAQ OTC or both combined. Thus, accounting beta can be used as an ex-ante 





2.2.4 Ownership Structure and Underpricing of IPOs 
Stoughton and Zechner (1998), Brennan and Franks (1997), and Hill (2006) analyze 
different IPO mechanisms on the ownership structure and how it may affect the 
company post issue.  
Brennan and Franks (1997) obtain a variety of 69 IPOs in the UK to examine how the 
ownership structure and regulation affects the outcome of offering price. The setting 
of the offering price is necessary because a large number of shares are allocated to the 
directors; together with the investment bankers. They also found that from this 
research a high percentage of shares owned by pre-IPO shareholders are sold at the 
IPO or in the following years on average. By selling IPOs in the post-IPO market, it 
can help investors to avoid some costsof underpricing associated with the IPO.Over 
75% of underpricing costs are borne by non-directors and the costs to directors are 
only 0.77% of the value as a fraction of their pre-IPO holdings. In addition, the result 
also shows a negative relationship between the size of underpricing and the size of 
large blocks assembled after the IPO, which proves the consistence with the 
underpricing and the dissemination of outsiders.  
Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) also aim at UK IPO firms and argue that executive’s 
power and previous experience influencethe choice of nonexecutive directors and 
their ownership interest in the firm. These governance factors can be used to reduce 
the size of underpricing. 
 




Prasad, Vozikis, and Ariff (2006) considered the impact of government policy to IPO 
based on the case of Malaysia in1976.They found new shares are significantly 
underpriced in the short run and long run for both the pre-policy period and 
post-policy period. However, new shares appear to be more significantly underpriced 
in the post-policy period than in the pre-policy period. This, in turn, proves that 
government regulatory intervention can “manipulate” the offering price based on the 
current macroeconomic policy. 
 
2.2.6 Debt Financing and Underpricing of IPOs 
Debt financing is one way to raise capital. When companies raise money for working 
capital or capital expenditure, they usually sell bonds or notes to investors. In return, 
investors will become creditors and receive payment periodically. However, if 
companies currently have more growth options, they will require more cash flows and 
less incentive to distribute dividends to investors. 
According to Smith and Watts (1992), firms with strong growth potential require less 
debt financing due to some problems associated with debt financing. High-growth 
potential firms have less incentive to use dividends than those low-growth firms. 
Therefore, once they decide to go public, the market will see the riskiness. To 
compensate for the risk, firms will usually offer a discount to the IPOs. Thus, debt 
financing is positively correlated with first-day return. 
 




Litigation risk can be regarded as acorporation’s likelihood of getting taken to court. 
For a corporation to go public, the cost of litigation is considerable. The settlement 
cost is one of the highest litigation costs. The average cost is $7 million with a sample 
size of 1841 IPOs, which occupies 20% of the total proceeds. Lowry and Shu (2000) 
suggested that future litigation costs contribute to the underpricing of IPOs. They 
proved the relationship between the litigation risk and the degree of underpricing. 
Usually, firms with greater litigation risk tend to underprice their IPOs by a greater 
amount.  
 
2.3 Hypothesis of Signaling to the market 
One other factor that explains the underpricing of IPOs is signaling. The signaling 
model is correlated with the asymmetric information. For companies with 
strongprospects and higher possibilities of success, they should sendclear signals to 
the market when they decide to go public. For companies with lower possibilities of 
success, the signal must be expensive in case thoseinvestors will make adverse 
selection in the IPOs market. Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Allen and Faulhabe (1988) 
proved the existence of signaling in the IPOs market. Grinblatt and Hwang developed 
a signaling model with two signals, two attributes, and a continuing of signal levels 
and attributes types, to explain the underpricing phenomenon. In the model, issuers 
have better information about the company’s future and profits than outside investors. 
The signaling model is scheduled with a function of project variance and issuer’s 




the company’s intrinsic value is positively related to the underpricing of the 
IPO.Underpricing of the IPO is a reliableproof that shows business is doing well to 
investors. Only good firms are expected to recapture the loss after they send the signal 
to the IPOs market. The issuers of bad firms already know their expected performance 
and the true market value. They think it is difficult to recover the loss from 
underpricing. Thus, they cannot afford to signal to the IPOs market.  
Cao and Shi (2001) developed their studies on the Internet bubble in 1999. 
Specifically, they analyzed the clustering phenomenon of underpricing of IPOs and 
found that the clustering is more likely to occur in economic expansion than 
contraction. 
 
2.4 IPOs of Privately-Owned Companies and State-Owned Enterprises 
In their study of public offering of privately-owned companies and public-owned 
enterprises of different countries, Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) found that IPOs of 
state-owned enterprise in the UK are significantly underpriced compare to their 
privately-owned enterprises. However, similar studies carried out in Canada and 
Malaysia was inconsistent with those of the UK study. In Canada and Malaysia, IPOs 
of privately-owned enterprise are significantly underpriced than those of state-owned 
enterprises. However, this does not appear to be a general tendency for privatization 
to be underpriced. They provide additional evidence on the determinants of 
privatization initial returns, indicating that initial returns are significantly higher in 





2.5 IPOs in the Long-run 
Most of studies of underpricing are considered as the short-term performance. It is 
critical to measure the immediate market reaction once the company goes public. 
However, an interesting question at this point is whether IPOs are underpriced in the 
long-run. Goergen, Khurshed, and Mudambi (2007) tested the long-rum performance 
of UK IPOs. They related the long-run performance of IPOs with pre-IPO financial 
performance of the firm as well as the managerial decisions. It was found that the 
percentage of equity issued and the degree of multi-nationality of a firm are the key 
predictors of long-run performance of IPOs. Also, small firms behave differently from 
large firms and lose more in the long term. These findings imply the importance of 
information for the perspective long term investors in new issues. Another point is the 
pre-IPO performance of a firm cannot predict the post-IPO performance with certainty. 
This study suggests that long-term investors should be cautious while deciding on the 













Methodology and Data Collection 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we will discuss the details of data selection and methodology. This 
paper investigates the multiple factors influencing the underpricing of IPOs. The 
chapter attempts to develop the empirical evidence based on the conclusions we 
provide. 
3.2 Data Collection 
The sample used in this analysis consists of 176 initial public offerings listed in the 
London Stock Exchange from January 1, 2002 to January 1, 2012 including all 
industries. The primary source of data is from Bloomberg Terminal. A total of 38 IPOs 
were excluded from the sample because of missing the firm age, missing the first day 
closing price, or missing the issue size. Finally, 138 IPOs were identified to form the 
test sample. 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable used in this study is the degree of underpricing (DUP). DUP 
is often used to examine the mispricing issue for the first trading day of IPOs. It is 









Pi0 is the initial offering price of stock i 
If DUP is positive, it means the IPO is underpriced. 
If DUP is negative, it means the IPO is overpriced. 
If DUP is zero, it means the IPO is correctly priced. 
3.3.2 Model Specification 
This paper used the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression to test the relationship 
between the underpricing of IPOs and multiple factors. The general model is used as 
follow: 
DUPi=α+ ∑ βiXi+ε 
Where, 
 DUP is the degree of underpricing 
 α is the intercept of the model 
 ∑βiXi is the sum of independent variables  
 ε is the error term 
However, to get better knowledge of underpricing of IPOs, OLS regression identifies 
seven variables. They represent issue size, firm age, P/E ratio, underwriter reputation, 





• LNSIZE represents the log of the issue size. The issue size refers total volume of 






• LNAGE represents the log of the firm age and it’s calculated from the established 
date to the offering date 
 
• RISK represents the systematic risk of the firm (Beta) 
 
• D1represents the underwriter reputation, a dummy variable that set for “1” if the 
underwriter ranks in top 10 in the London Stock Exchange, and “0” otherwise 
D1 = �
1, if underwriter ranks in top 10
0,                                       otherwise
  
• PE represents the P/E ratio of the firm at the end of the year before company goes 
public 
• ROA represents the ratio of return on asset at the end of the year before company 
goes public 
• DEBT represents the debt ratio and it’s calculated at the end of the year before 
company goes public 
 
The rational question behind the equation is whether there is a significant degree of 
under-pricing affected by those independent variables. Based on the previous studies, 
the following expected hypotheses are considered: 
Hypothesis 1: The issue size is negatively related to the DUP 
Hypothesis2: The firm age is negatively related to the DUP 
Hypothesis 3: The systematic risk is positively related to DUP 
Hypothesis 4: The underwriter reputation is negatively related to DUP 




Hypothesis 6: ROA is positively related to DUP 
Hypothesis 7: The debt ratio is positively related to DUP 
3.3.3 Independent Variables 
Issue Size: refers to the number of shares issued at the offering date. It’s a signaling 
variable that has been studied by many researches. They proved that the offer size has 
an inverse relationship with IPOs under-pricing. Specifically, the more shares 
company issues, the fewer probabilities IPOs are underpriced.This study transfer the 
issue size by using the log function and it’s aiming at decrease the volatility of the 
issue size. 
Firm Age: is defined in years, is one of the typical ex-ante uncertainty proxies 
influencing the degree of underpricing. Age of the firm represents the level of the 
maturity and it can also signal the IPO market. Usually, underwriters will choose the 
long established companies. It explains that a firm with longer operational years will 
have fewer possibilities to misprice its IPO. This study measure the age in log because 
the log functions follow a normal distribution. In this paper, the age is the difference 
between the founded year and the year the company goes public. 
Underwriter Reputation:  
Table 3.1: Top 20 Investment BanksInthe London Stock Exchange In Terms of 
Numbers of Issues Managed from 2002 to 2012 
JP Morgan 1 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch 2 
Goldman Sachs & Co 3 
UBS 4 
Citi 5 




Libertas Capital Group PLC 7 
Patersons Securities Ltd 8 
Walker Crips Stockbrokers Ltd 9 
Hybridan LLP 10 
Caledonian Capital Ltd 11 
InsingerTownsley 12 
Nabarro Wells & Co Ltd 13 
FirstEnergy Capital Corp 14 
Quam Securities Co Ltd 15 
Renaissance Capital Pty Ltd 16 
Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd 17 
Rivington Street Corporate Finance Ltd 18 
Jeffreys Henry Financial Services Ltd 19 
Blue Oar Securities PLC 20 
Table 1 is retrieved from Bloomberg Terminal. They rank underwriters reputation by 
the issue size. Here, this paper defines the underwriter reputation as dummy variable. 
There are 46 IPOs issued by top 10 investment banks and 93 IPOs issued by 
investment banks ranking below top 10. 
Risk: is represented by return beta. Standard deviation cannot be observed directly 
from the IPO market. Therefore, this study will consider only the systematic risk 
instead of the total standard deviation.  
P/E Ratio: is observed at the end of the year before companies go public. The P/E 
ratio is extremely important from high-technology industries, especially during the 
bubble year from at 1999. IPOs are significantly underpriced with higher P/E ratio.  
ROA: is calculated a year before companies go public. This is a new independent 
variable this paper considers. Usually, market will receive a positive signal to higher 
ROA. This may lead to IPOs mispricing. Thus, the research will expect ROA to have 
a significant relationship to IPOs.  




is currently in the growth phase, it will need more cash. Then, the company will have 
less incentive to distribute dividends to shareholders and investors. The assumption 
under the research is to find out if there is a significant relationship between debt ratio 

























4.1 Theory:  
This paper investigates factors influencing the degree of underpricing in the London 
Stock Exchange and the relationship between the independent variables and 
under-pricing of IPOs. 
4.2 Empirical Results 
Table 4.1: Summary of the Sample Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      pe 117 24.99338 13.64056 8.0984 78.39 
ipocloseda~e 117 3.612231 7.734056 .075 70.1 
ipopriceusd 117 3.506636 7.716724 .07 70 
dup 117 .0689744 .148332 -.77 .54 
      issuesizem 117 1888.207 16843.09 .736653 182193 
lnage 117 2.686838 1.235563 0 5.43 
debt 117 .2036752 .2020652 .01 .82 
roa 117 7.969316 8.46842 -15.46 48.85 
      dummy 117 .3418803 .4763799 0 1 
risk 117 .4303419 .5971541 -1.2 2.25 
lnsize 117 4.38081 1.916497 -.3011051 12.11282 
 
From the STATA program, the summary of the DUP contains the mean, standard 
deviation, and minimum & maximum statistical numbers. The average of the DUP 
from the sample is 6.89744% which explains that among 117 IPOs, the average 
abnormal return is 6.89744%. The highest initial return of IPO is 54% and the lowest 





4.3 Regression Analysis Results 




Table 4.2 Regression Analysis of DUP and Independent Variables 
dup Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
       pe .001671 .00109 1.53 0.128 -.0004893 .0038313 
lnsize -.0201096 .0100475 -2.00 0.048 -.0400234 -.0001957 
lnage -.0014414 .0111873 -0.13 0.898 -.0236143 .0207314 
dummy -.0229323 .037908 -0.60 0.546 -.0980648 .0522001 
roa .001972 .0019416 1.02 0.312 -.0018762 .0058202 
risk .0471395 .0253341 1.86 0.065 -.0030719 .0973509 
debt .1365713 .0769661 1.77 0.079 -.0159731 .2891156 
_cons .0632725 .0625148 1.01 0.314 -.0606297 .1871748 
       
 
From the Table 4.2, it shows the result of regression analysis of DUP against the 
independent variables. The regression analysis proves the Hypothesis 1 that the issue 
size has a negative relationship with DUP at 5% significant level. Thus, the research 
reflects that in the London Stock Exchange, the higher volume of shares issued at the 
offering date, the lower the chance the IPO will be mispriced. Evidence found from 
the UK stock market is the Hypothesis 3. DUP in the London Stock Exchange has a 
positive relationship at 10% significant level. In another way saying, investors will be 
compensated for the systematic riskbecause the higher the beta the higher opportunity 
the IPO will be traded at discount. The last founding from this study is Hypothesis 6. 
At 10% significant level, the debt ratio has a positive relationship with DUP. 
Generally, in the London Stock Exchange market, the for UK companies with great 




dividend. IPOs issued by those companies are usually underpriced as well.  
However, from the regression model, STATA failed to prove the significance of the 
firm age, ROA, underwriter reputation, and P/E ratio. So we consider running the 
regression test for these four independent variables separately. 
Table 4.3: Regression Analysis of DUP and LNAGE 
dup Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
      lnage -.0092784 .0111614 -0.83 0.408 -.031387 .0128303 
_cons .0939038*** .0329833 2.85 0.005 .0285703 .1592373 
      
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The Table 4.3 explains that the firm age is not significant to the DUP in the UK stock 
market which is contrary from the Hypothesis 2. However, the sign shows a negative 
relationship, and this is inconsistent with the classical assumption. Therefore, firm age 
does not influence the pricing of IPOs those are trading in the London Stock 
Exchange. 
Table 4.4: Regression Analysis of DUP and ROA 
dup Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
       roa .0007568 .0016318 0.46 0.644 -.0024756 .0039892 
_cons .0629433*** .018933 3.32 0.001 .0254407 .1004458 
       
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The P value is 0.644 and the value is extremely high at all significant level. It proves 
that ROA does not influence the pricing of IPO and this is not consistent with the 
assumption of the Hypothesis 6. 
Table 4.5: Regression Analysis of DUP and Underwriter Reputation 
dup Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
       dummy -.0390877 .028806 -1.36 0.177 -.0961469 .0179715 
_cons .0823377*** .016843 4.89 0.000 .0489748 .1157005 




Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
From Rogue’s research, he found that underwriter reputation is negatively related to 
the DUP. This paper defines the underwriter reputation as a dummy variable. When 
the underwriter ranks in top 10, it represents 1, and 0, otherwise. But the test shows a 
different result. Underwriter reputation is not significant to the pricing of IPO. By 
look upon the summary of underwriter reputation, the mean is 0.34 and the standard 
deviation is 0.48. This demonstrates most of IPOs trading in the London Stock 
Exchange are issued by underwriters those rank below top 10. Still, the underwriter 
reputation has an inverse relationship with DUP. 
Table 4.6: Regression Analysis of DUP and P/E ratio 
dup Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
       pe .0013954 .0010019 1.39 0.166 -.0005891 .0033799 
_cons .034158 .0284851 1.20 0.233 -.0222656 .0905815 
       
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
So far, the P/E ratio is the last test variable. From the regression result, P/E ratio is not 
significant to DUP even if the standard deviation is extremely low. Thus, we can 
eliminate the data collection problem. Basically, P/E ratio does not contribute a lot to 











Conclusion & Limitation 
5.1 Conclusion 
This study examines the degree of underpricing of IPOs in the London Stock 
Exchange. There are 117 companies selected during the period January 2002 to 
January 2012. The underpricing is observed in the London Stock Exchange with the 
average abnormal return of 6.89%. The result shows that IPOs have statistically 
significant first-day return in line with the underpricing of IPOs. 
This paper investigates possible explanations to the degree of underpricing using the 
regression analysis. Six independent variables were regressed against the degree of 
underpricing, including issue size, firm age, risk, underwriter reputation, debt ratio, 
P/E ratio, and ROA. Among all these six factors, we identify that in the London Stock 
Exchange, issue size, risk, and debt ratio have significant influence to the pricing of 
IPOs. Specifically, companies experience lower chance of mispricing with large issue 
size, which is contrary to the risk and debt ratio. High risk and high percentage of debt 
will contribute to the degree of mispricing to those companies that go public. 
Meanwhile, the sample does not prove the significance of the firm age, underwriter 
reputation, P/E ratio, and ROA.  
Theoretically, lots of researches have proved the firm age and underwriter reputation 
are important factors influencing the underpricing of IPOs. This test result does not 
support these two hypotheses. We believe that the volatility of the UK firm age is 




won’t be a significant factor to influence the pricing of IPOs at UK. This paper 
defines the underwriter reputation focusing on the numbers of IPOs issued within the 
time range from 2002 to 2012. Also, we design the dummy variable as 1 if the 
underwriter ranks in top 10. Since over half of IPOs are written by underwriters below 
top 10, it leads to the rejection of the significance of underwriter reputation. However, 
the negative sign is consistent to the Hypothesis 4.All these results show that large 
companies are found to be associated with a lower degree of underpricing.  
5.2 Limitation 
There are several limitations that might affect the result of the research. The first one 
is the data collection. Due to the data missing problem and confidentiality, we are not 
able to get all the information needed for the regression test. In result, only limited 
numbers of IPOs can be collected from the market, and the conclusion of this research 
might be mislead by this factor. The second one is the ignorance of the cost. Without 
IPOs issuing fees, underwriter cost and transaction cost, the degree of IPO 
underpricing can be enlarged. The last but not the least one is the currently 
macroeconomic situation in Europe. Due to the Europe sovereign debt crisis, this 
on-going financial crisis slows down their economic expansion. In the literature 
review, policy is another key factor to influence the underpricing of IPOs.  
In view of the above, we suggest that in addition to the points mentioned before, 
future studies also consider by adding more examining independent variables, 
including industry category, joint effect by combining issue size and firm age together, 
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